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ABSTRACT
Academics, global leaders, and practitioners have debated, for
decades, over the best management models (public, private,
decentralized) of water utilities for increasing water access. Proponents
of privatized water utilities argue profit motive incentivizes efficiency
leading cost saving, infrastructure improvements, and increase usage.
Proponents of publicly owned water utilities argue that efficiency is
improved do to accountably to a constituency. Proponents of
decentralized utilities argue locally owned water utilities maximize
resource efficiency and eliminate waste because of accountability and
local knowledge.
This thesis investigated whether these debates over the best
management model for increasing accessibility oversimplify a complex
global development issue. To investigate the impact of management
models of water utilities had on water coverage this thesis used
statistical analysis coupled with three water utility case studies (Aguas
Argentina (AASA) in Argentina, Companhia de Saneamento Basico do
Estado de São Paulo (SABESP) in Brazil, Cooperativa de Servicios
Públicos Santa Cruz (SAGUAPAC) in Bolivia). Statistical analysis did not
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identify a satisfactory relationship between management models and
water coverage. Additionally, case studies showed nuanced factors
external to management models significantly impacted a utility’s water
coverage.
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AASA-

ABBREVIATIONS
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ARENA-
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Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region
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PLANSA-

Plano Nacional de Saneament Basico

PMDB-

Brazilian Democratic Movement Party
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World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure
database
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SABESP-

Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de São Paulo

SAGUAPAC-

Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Santa Cruz

SISAB-

Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico

SUMA-

Servicio Universal y Mejora Ambiental (Universal Service
and Environmental Improvement)
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Research Statement
In 2000, Cochabamba, Bolivia privatized its municipal water utility
resulting in massive protests and push back by the city’s residents.
Typically referred to as the ‘Cochabamba Water Wars’, the episode
epitomizes a decades long debate about the impact of management
models of water utilities on water access. Various international
governmental and nongovernmental agencies estimate that anywhere
from 880 million to 1.1 billion people lack adequate drinking water
access.1 Academics, global leaders, and practitioners have debated, for
decades, the best ways to increase access. Pro-market donor
organizations, like the World Bank, have commonly argued that privately
operated water utilities position water as an economic good rather than
a public good. This commoditization can discourage over consumption
and waste while generating much needed revenue for the infrastructure
1

The term ‘adequate drinking water access’, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO),
refers to “the improved service of piped water delivery provided by water utilities.” Water access is
defined broadly by the WHO as, “the availability of at least 20 liters per person per day from an
‘improved source’ within 1 kilometer of the users dwelling.” The term ‘improved source’ is further
defined as, “types of technology and levels of service that are more likely to provide safe water, such
as household connections, public standpipes, protected wells.” Service delivery is a broad concept as
well, which could include delivery by bottled water or truck. Typically water utilities are integrated
systems consisting of water treatment plants and delivery infrastructure (i.e. piping and
infrastructure) responsible for accessing, filtering, sanitizing and delivering fresh drinking. This thesis
will focus on piped water delivery provided by water utilities.
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improvements of water utilities. Improvements to infrastructure can
increase access by lowering the cost of piped water delivery. In
opposition, it has been argued that water access is a universal right, a
natural monopoly, and cannot be commoditized. Furthermore,
privatization will increase the cost of water access leading increased
access challenges for impoverished communities. Therefore, ownership
of water utilities should remain in the public sphere.
This thesis investigated whether these debates over the best
ownership model for increasing accessibility oversimplify a complex
global development issue. This thesis used statistical analysis coupled
with case studies to investigate the impact management models of
water utilities in developing countries2 had on water coverage. A
statistical analysis of 144 water utilities in 33 different countries did not
establish a satisfactory level of significance between management
models and water coverage. Case studies of a privately owned water
utility in Argentina, a publically owned water utility in Brazil, and a water

2

The World Bank, “Data - Country Classification.”; defines developing as, “countries with GNI per
capita measurement of less than $11,905.” Countries with a GNI score below $976 as low income,
$976 to $3,855 lower middle income, and $3,855 to $11,905 as upper middle income.
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cooperative in Bolivia showed that factors external to ownership
significantly impacted water coverage.
Discussed in the Literature Review Section, proponents of each
ownership model commonly claim that their model increases water
coverage through efficiency improvements. Proponents of privatized
water utilities argue that commodification of water creates profit motive
that incentivizes efficiency. Proponents of publicly owned water utilities
argue that efficiency is improved because utility managers are
accountable to a constituency. Proponents of decentralized water
utilities argue that locally owned water utilities are more suited to
maximize resource efficiency and eliminate waste because of
accountability and local knowledge. After reviewing the literature
covering management models this thesis started from the assumption
that management models do impact water coverage.
A regression model was used to identify statistical relationships
between the water coverage of water utilities (categorized as public,
private, or decentralized enterprise) and three independent variables
that measure a utility’s efficiency. The regression model used water
utility performance data collected from the International Benchmarking

12

Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET)3 program. The
dependent variable was IBNET’s indicator ‘water coverage’ defined as
“the percentage of population with access to water services as a
percentage of the total population under utility’s nominal
responsibility.”4 The collected independent variables were: water
production,5 non-revenue water,6 and unit operational cost.7 Regression
analysis measured the relationship between the water coverage of
categorized water utilities and their levels of water production, nonrevenue water, and unit operational cost.
To test the assumption that management models impact water
coverage through efficiency regression analysis would need to establish
a relationship between at least one ownership model’s (private, public,
or decentralized ) water coverage and all three independent variableswater production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost. This

3

IBNET is a non-governmental organization that is funded by United Kingdom’s Department for
International Development, The World Bank, and The United Nations Water and Water and Sanitation
Program. IBNET collects water and sanitation utility performance data and creates a benchmarking
program that allows participating utilities access to comparative information.
4
“IBNET Indicators,” 2.
5
Ibid., 3. Water Production is defined as, “litres/person/day; total annual water sold expressed by
populations served per day.
6
Ibid., 5. Non-revenue water is the “difference between water supplied and water sold (i.e. volume
of water lost) expressed as a percentage of net water supplied.
7
Ibid., 8. Unit operational water cost is the “annual water service operational expense/total annual
volume sold.”
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thesis hypothesized that all three management models will show
relationships between water coverage and the three independent
variables.
Regression analysis showed statistically significant relationships
between each ownership model’s water coverage and the independent
variables. Both publicly and privately owned water utilities had inverse
relationship between water coverage and non-revenue water.
Decentralized water utilities had a statistically significant relationship
between water coverage and unit operational cost. Regression analysis
showed that perhaps there is a weak relationship between ownership
model, water coverage, and efficiency.
This thesis analyzed one case study from each categorized
ownership model to identify the positive and negative factors that
impact the performance of water utilities. Kate Bayliss, from the
University of Greenwich, has argued, “the nature of ownership does not
necessarily indicate how an enterprise will perform.”8 For Bayliss,
pricing, utility history, cost recovery, and the political environment
influence utility performance. This thesis’ three case studies concur with
8

Bayliss, “Utility Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 529.
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Bayliss’ conclusion by showing that factors external to management
models impacted water coverage.
For the privately owned case study this thesis looked at Aguas
Argentina (AASA) a privatized water utility operating in Buenos Aires,
Argentina. AASA was awarded a 30 year concession contract but failed
to meet contracted performance targets for expanding water coverage.
Reviewed literature showed a rushed privatization process established
institutions that failed to mediate the unique challenges created by local
historical, political, geographic, and economic factors.
For the publicly owned case study this thesis looked at the
Brazilian water and sanitation utility the Companhia de Saneamento
Basico do Estado de São Paulo (SABESP) a public corporation primarily
owned by the state of São Paulo. This case study found that the rise of
democracy in Brazil played a significant role in SABESP’s success in
expanding water coverage.
For the decentralized case study this thesis looked at the
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Santa Cruz (SAGUAPAC), a water and
sewage utility serving the city of Santa Cruz de La Sierra, Bolivia. The
wealth of SAGUAPAC’s service area coupled with World Bank loans
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played a significant role in the Bolivian utility’s successful expansion of
water coverage.
Highlighted earlier, the Cochabamba Water Wars emphasizes the
importance of this research. Water availability is not just a business
need or an economic need- it is needed for human existence.
Distributions in access can lead to violent reactions as demonstrated in
Cochabamba. The next section reviews the literature on type of water
coverage and production for this basic life necessity. Poor water access
is often associated with poverty. For impoverished municipalities,
states, and countries with limited resources and alternatives a better
understanding of water delivery mechanism can be critical. The findings
from this research contribute to the understanding that management
models alone do not positively or negatively impact water access. More
nuanced factors like a region’s laws, geography, history, and economics
have significant impact on water accessibility.
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Literature Review
While the management models have been separated into three
different categories it could be argued that these categories themselves
are oversimplified. Within each category- private, public, and
decentralized- there is variance in governance and legal structures. This
Literature Review section begins with an overview of each ownership
model and their various structures. Following, will be an examination of
the various arguments surrounding water ownership.
Types of Management models
For the most part water ownership and delivery was the purview
of states and municipalities. During the 18th and 19th century, states and
municipalities were the only entities capable of expanding water service
to rapidly growing populations. This largely contributed to the
ascendancy of states and municipalities in water delivery9 Occurring in
the last few decades of the 20th century international organizations like

9

Hall and Lobina, “Water as a Public Service,” 2–7. Authors’ note that states and
municipalities as water providers began with European countries and expanded globally
through colonialism. France was a notable exception with private companies contracted by
municipalities as utility operators.
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the World Bank promoted the idea that private companies are better at
water delivery than state or municipal management.10 Later, in the
Aguas Argentina case study this thesis discusses how this promotion of
privatization influenced the Argentinian government in the 1990’s.
Privatization of water utilities exists on a spectrum. At one end of
the spectrum a private company may have complete ownership of a
water utility; while at the other end a private company may be
contracted by the state to manage a utility. When a private company
completely owns a water utility they own the infrastructure- processing
(plants and sanitation) with delivery (water pipes). Often they have
more agency over business decision allowing more capability to increase
profits. At the opposite end of the spectrum a private company
contracted to run a utility will have less agency over business decision
and will be more dependent on generating profits through efficiency
gains. Despite the variability in ownership perception of water is similar.
Privatized water utilities view water as a commodity and seek to
maximize profits through efficiency gains. Private utilities strive to
produce more water at lower cost while decreasing non-revenue water.
10

Bakker, “The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’: Alter-Globalization, AntiPrivatization and the Human Right to Water in the Global South.,” 433–436.
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The privatization of a state or municipally owned water utility can
occur through a divesture sale, concession contract, a lease agreement,
or a management contract. A full divesture sale occurs when a water
utility is sold by a state or municipality to a private company giving the
organization complete control over water delivery, maintenance,
infrastructure, and billing.11 Concession contracts are a more common
form of privatization and occur when a company “takes over the
management of a state owned enterprise for a given period.”12
Privatization can also occur when private companies lease water rights
from the state, or are contracted to manage the utility, allowing for
government to have more influence on ownership and investment
decisions.13
Publicly owned water utilities are owned and managed by a
national or state/provincial government. Water is viewed as a universal
good and a natural monopoly. Public water utilities in various countries
tend to be owned and managed by national or state/provincial
governments and are responsible for the maintenance and operation of
11

Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, “PPI Glossary - Private Infrastructure Projects - The
World Bank & PPIAF.”
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
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all levels of water distribution and sanitation.14 Typically, a public water
utility can be managed as a ministry or department, a statutory body, or
as a public company, each with different management structures and
oversight. Water utilities that are managed as a ministry or department
of the government may operate under a system of direct control and
oversight and do not exist as a separate legal entity. A water utility that
is a statutory body is typically owned by the government and operates
under public law, with a legal act establishing it as an autonomous
corporate body. A public company may demonstrate similar
characteristics of a private company, but with government by and large
acting as the main shareholder.15
Decentralized utilities are operated by local entities like city
council, municipal government, water association, or a water
cooperative. Similar to publicly owned water utilities, decentralized
water utilities view water as a universal good. The difference is that
utility governorship should be handled at the local level.
Decentralization can occur in a variety of ways with the most
common systems occurring when a national government transfers
14
15

Gleick et al., “The New Economy of Water,” 26–27.
Baietti and van Ginneken, “Characteristics of Well - Permforming Public Water Utilities,” 2–3.
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authority to a more localized entity. For example, local entities – city
council, municipal government, water association, or a water
cooperative – can be given decision-making ability over water utilities
and the authority to collect revenue in the forms of taxes or tariffs.16
The local water entity may then serve as the policymaking and
regulating body. Below that body a service operator may be set up and
charged with the day-to-day operations of the water utility.17
Alternatively, service operations may be contracted out to a private
company. Under a mixed capital model the municipality may choose to
sell a small fraction of utility ownership to smaller water associations
operating in the service areas.18
An increasingly popular form of decentralization is the water
cooperative. Similar to publicly managed management models,
cooperatives do not seek profit but to provide universal service
coverage. They differ in that they are owned by the utility’s
consumers- often called members. Cooperative governance structure is
typically designed to allow membership voting rights, oversight, and
16

Ribbot, Jesse, Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutionalizing Popular
Paricipation", 9.
17
Agrawai, “Enhancing Water Services through Performance Agreements,” 7.
18
Dickson, Eric, Management Models of Water and Sanitation: Approaches to Decentralization in
Honduras.
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accountability. Utility management is accountable to member elected
administrative and oversight boards- drawn from members.19

Public Good versus Economic Good
In general, private water utilities differ from public and
decentralized water utilities in its perception of water. Both public and
decentralized water utilities view water as a public good- it’s both noncompetitive and non-excludable. In contrast, private water utilities treat
water as an economic good and seek profit maximization.20
Proponents of privatization, occasionally referred to as ‘market
liberals’ or ‘neoliberals’, are characterized by the belief “that the free
market is the best mechanism to maximize resource consumption,
efficiency, and allocation.”21 In essence, these theories advocate for the
removal of government ownership and the liberalization of the market.
Market advocates argue that public resources, like water, will not be
efficiently utilized unless managed by the private sector. Privatization
will treat water as an economic good by establishing a price and

19
20
21

Ruiz-Mier and van Ginneken, “Consumer Cooperatives,” 6–7.
Budds and McGranahan, “Are the Debates on Water Privatization Missing the Point?,” 92–98.
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 5–38.
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concurrently a market. Priced water will be treated as a commodity
giving government, industry, and society incentive to conserve and
protect it. In addition, a market will bring about investment and
improvements in water infrastructure and technology. This will be
possible, “through efficiency gains and better management, private
companies will be able to lower prices, improve performance, and
increase cost recovery, enabling systems to be upgraded and
expanded.”22
Michael Goldman argues that privatization advocates, like the
World Bank, portray the private sector as benevolent actors working
strictly to increase water access for the global impoverished. This
benevolent perception is broadly fictitious. The private sector is largely
motivated by profit and concerned with cost recovery, which often leads
to price increases and water cutoffs to the impoverished.23 In
opposition, market advocates often argue that publicly managed water
utilities attempt to ensure affordability by using cost subsidization
schemes to keep water tariffs low. Frederick Segerfeldt argues that

22

Bakker, “The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’: Alter-Globalization, Anti-Privatization and the
Human Right to Water in the Global South.,” 437.
23
Goldman, Imperial Nature, 221–271.
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such subsidization schemes set prices so low “that on average it only
covers about 30 percent of the water supplies expenses.”24 In essence,
public water utilities lack the adequate cost recovery needed to prevent
infrastructure deterioration and increase in inaccessibility of piped water.
Essentially, privatization proponents commonly argue that privatized
water utilities’ profit motive ensures cost recovery, which is used for
infrastructure maintenance and expansion.25
Within the last few decades’ market advocates have successfully
promoted markets and privatization as a viable solution to many global
issues related to economic development, human rights, and
environmental degradation.26 In regards to development, market
advocates argue that the public sector has failed in providing drinking
water to an estimated one billion people. It is not uncommon for
governments to engage in corrupt behavior by allocating resources to
appease the more politically connected upper and middle class and
neglect the impoverished. Likewise, a privatized water sector may be
more apt, competent, and less politically corrupt in delivering water

24
25
26

Segerfeldt, Water for Sale, 45.
Ibid., 43–58.
Dezalay and Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars.
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services to the poor.27 Such arguments and studies supported the
declaration of water as an “economic good” at the 1992 International
Conference on Water and Environment.28 In opposition, authors Bond
and Goldman argue that global neoliberal organizations, like the IMF
and the World Bank, use water scarcity and development as a vehicle to
push pro-market solutions onto developing countries. Goldman
describes how World Bank promotes privatization programs through a
transnational policy network of development specialists, government
technocrats, and journalists, who are dependent upon the Bank’s
largesse.29 Bond draws on South Africa’s experience with utility
privatization to show how privatization programs, imposed by external
global institutions, fail and result in populist anti-privatization
movements.30 A theme found in both authors’ work is that privatization
is a project that is imposed by external actors that results in disconnect
between the development rhetoric of neoliberal institutions and the
interest of peoples in developing countries.

27
28
29
30

Segerfeldt, Water for Sale.
Gleick et al., “The New Economy of Water,” 6.
Goldman, Imperial Nature, 221–270.
Bond, “Water Commodification and Decommodification Narratives.”
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Market proponent arguments are based on the assumption that
water can be converted from a public good, where water is nonexcludable, to an economic good, where water is excludable and set by
price. In contrast, the opponents of privatization argue that the
conversion of water into an economic good is not possible because it is
a product that lacks competition and cost-reflective pricing.
With regard to competition, academics commonly contend that
water utilities are natural monopolies because the technological and
associated costs for water utilities are so high “it is more economical for
a single firm to supply services than two or more competing firms.”31
Privatization opponents argue that because water utilities operate as a
natural monopoly there is no competition and without competition for
market share, privatized water utilities will have no incentive to
maximize efficiency, minimize cost, and invest in infrastructure, repairs,
research and development of new technologies.32 Proponents of
privatization argue that there are various schemes and mechanisms that
simulate competition. For example, franchise bidding, a concept
pioneered by Demsetz in 1968, is a process where the private sector
31
32

Joskow, “Regulation of Natural Monopoly.”
Vickers and Yarrow, “Economic Perspectives on Privatization,” 116.
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competes “to become the sole producer in a naturally monopolistic
industry.”33 Furthermore, Demsetz asserts that this process would be
viable alternative to rate regulation in controlling the behaviors of
natural monopolies.34 Also, benchmarking programs like IBNET use
yardstick measurements like water coverage, water production, nonrevenue water, and unit operational costs to create a matrix where
individual water utilities can compare their performance against one
another.35
For pricing, market advocates like Peter Rogers, Radhika de Silva,
and Ramesh Bhatia argue “the correct pricing of private and public
goods can lead to gains in economic efficiency.”36 Using neoclassical
marginal cost theory the authors argue that when water is correctly
priced there is a demand in reduction, efficient reallocation of the
resource, and increase in supply.”37 Bakker argues water is a public
good that cannot be ‘correctly priced’ because of the temporal and
spatial externalities associated with water. A crude and simplified
explanation of this point is that water utilities delivering potable piped
33
34
35
36
37

Prager, “Firm Behavior in Franchise Monopoly Markets,” 211.
Demsetz, “Why Regulate Utilities?”
van den Berg and Dailenko, “IBNET-a Global Database of the Water Sector’s Performance.”
Rogers, De Silva, and Bhatia, “Water Is an Economic Good,” 2.
Ibid.
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water to consumers must adjust to a variety of geographical features.
Some households may be located on top of a hill, while other users are
located in a valley. In addition, some consumers may live farther away
from a water utility requiring more expenditure to deliver potable water.
In essence, utilities cannot accurately price water because the delivery
of water to consumers has uneven costs.38
Opponents to privatization argue that attempts to maximize profits
by establishing a market price for water negatively impacts access in
developing countries. For example, Bayliss demonstrates that
mathematical cost recovery schemes, like the Automatic Tariff
Adjustment (ATA) formula, have negatively impacted consumers. The
ATA is a mathematical equation designed to pass infrastructure cost,
inflation, and currency depreciation onto consumers. Both the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund have promoted the ATA.39
This mathematical equation has led to price increases by water utilities
in Sub-Saharan Africa forcing impoverished populations to either rely on
unimproved water resources or cut costs in other areas of family

38
39

Bakker, “Neoliberalizing Nature?,” 556–559.
Bayliss, “Utility Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 517.
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spending such as health care.40 Privatization opponents argue that due
to the volatile nature of water pricing utilities should be operated by the
state because it can set tariffs that are accompanied with a policy of
cross-subsidization which will ensure utility cost recovery without a price
increase on the poor. Admittedly, cross-subsidization policies can be
enacted for privatized water utilities; however, states that are engaged
in neoliberal projects of privatization tend to reduce government’s role,
which may then lead to a decrease in subsidies.

Financing of Local Managed Utilities
Water utilities can be managed by localized entities like municipal
governments or community water boards. Nobel Lauriat Elinor Ostrom’s
work has promoted the management of common goods, like forests,
fisheries, and water, to be the responsibility of local entities like
municipal governments or water cooperatives. The underpinning
philosophy of localized management over common resources like water
is that smaller communities with adequate resource management
capacity (e.g. through the transfer of traditional knowledge, partnership
40

Bayliss and Fine, Privatization and Alternative Public Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, 105–
120.
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with development NGOs) are more suited to maximize resource
efficiency and eliminate waste because of accountability and local
knowledge.41 However, critics argue that locally managed utilities have
their own governance and financing issues. Locally managed utilities
are often limited in their ability to raise the capital necessary for service
expansion. For water cooperatives, the not-for-profit mission is often a
deterrent for investors and international lenders. Typically, investors
look to maximize returns on investments; whereas cooperatives reinvest
gains back into infrastructure development. With limited opportunities
not-for-profit utilities are dependent upon government largesse for
funding.42

Summary
Again the management categories private, public, and
decentralized have variance. A privatized utility could be a divesture
sale, concession contract, or a management contract. They are
categorized together because they share the assumption that profit
motive will lead to increased water coverage. Similarly public
41
42

Ostrom, Governing the Commons.
Constance, “IDBAmerica: Are Cooperatives a Better Way to Solve Latin America’s Water Problems?”
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management also has some variance. They could be owned and
managed by a national, state, or provincial government. They could
exist as a government department or operate as a corporate board.
They are united in the periodization of full coverage over full cost
recovery. Decentralization is the most challenging category- in
particular listing municipality as a decentralized utility. It could be
argued that municipality should be listed as public because unlike a
cooperative it’s a government entity. For this thesis municipal is
categorized as decentralized because like water cooperatives and
associations municipal utilities prioritize servicing its community above
full cost recovery and profits.

31

Methods and Design

This thesis used both statistical analysis and case studies to
explore the impact management models of water utilities in developing
countries have on water coverage. Regression analysis was used to
identify possible relationships between the water coverage of
management models and identified dependent variables- water
production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost. Case studies
examined local political, economic, and historical factors that impacted
management models and their water coverage. This section describes
how sample utilities are selected and categorized, what utility indicators
will be used to measure performance, and how gathered data will be
analyzed.

Sample Selection
This thesis conducted a regression analysis using water utility data
from IBNET- a non-governmental organization that is funded by United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development, The World Bank,
and The United Nations Water and Sanitation Program. IBNET is the
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world’s largest performance database for water and sanitation utilities.
Performance data is used to establish benchmarks for inter-utility
comparisons that assist practitioners, governments, and regulators in
service improvement.43 On IBNET, water utility samples were drawn
from developing countries.44 One critique of the sample is that it is too
broad and the scope should be limited to a specific region with
similarities in geography, demographics, history, economics, and
politics. It is not uncommon for pro-privatization literature to use similar
data sets to reinforce such claims of improved efficiency and or
coverage. This analysis intends to engage in a similar exercise to test
the significance of management models influence on water coverage.
For this purpose, this thesis has selected a sample from 33 different
developing countries in order to minimize the influence of a variety of
local and specific factors on water utilities. This sample is also
influenced by data availability, and most significantly by the lack of data
provided to the IBNET database. Table 1 demonstrates the diversity of
countries and regions represented in the study.
43
44

“About IBNET: Objectives of IBNET.”

The World Bank, “Data - Country Classification.”; For 2008, The World Bank classifies countries
with a GNI score below $976 as low income, $976 to $3,855 lower middle income, and $3,855 to
$11,905 as upper middle income.
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Table 1: Sample Utilities by Country
Country

# Utilities

Private

Public

Decentralized

Argentina

6

4

1

1

Armenia

2

2

0

0

Benin

1

0

1

0

Bolivia

2

0

0

2

Brazil

23

0

23

0

Burkina Faso

1

0

1

0

Chile

11

10

0

1

China

2

2

0

0

Columbia

25

13

0

12

Costa Rica

1

0

1

0

Ecuador

1

1

0

0

Gabon

1

0

1

0

India

6

0

0

6

Kyrgyz Republic

1

1

0

0

Lao PDR

10

0

10

0

Malaysia

1

1

0

0

Mali

1

0

1

0

Mauritania

1

0

1

0

Mexico

2

2

0

0

Mozambique

1

1

0

0

Niger

1

0

1

0

Panama

1

0

1

0

Paraguay

4

0

4

0

Philippines

3

3

0

0

Poland

1

0

0

1

Romania

1

1

0

0

Russia

15

13

2

0

Rwanda

1

0

1

0

South Africa

14

0

0

14

Togo

1

0

1

0

Tunisia

1

0

1

0

Uganda

1

0

1

0

Uruguay

1

0

1

0

Total

144

54

53

37
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Once sample utilities were identified they were categorized as
public, private, or decentralized water utility. As discussed in the
Literature Review, these management models have different legal and
governance structures. These structures, defined in Table 2, were used
to identify and categorize sample utilities.
Table 2: Criteria for Utility Categorization
Economic

Criteria for Utility Categorization

Regime
Utilities that are owned, managed, or operated by the
Private

private sector through a full divesture sale, concession
contract, lease agreement, or management contract.
Utilities that are managed and operated by national or

Public

provincial governments as a department/ministry, statutory
body, or a government company.
Utilities that incorporate local entities like municipal

Decentralization governments, city councils, or water boards in management
process.

Sample utilities were identified through contemporary academic
literature and the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure
(PPI) database. The process of collection could have had a sample error
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in two ways. First, identified potential samples were matched with the
IBNET database to ensure complete data on required indicators.
Because of limited space on IBNET data output spreadsheets, utility
names are manipulated and shortened. For example “San Pedro MPC”
and “San Pedro RACL” are two similarly named utilities from the
Philippines. Such manipulations of utility names can lead to confusion
and to inaccurate categorization of samples. Second, samples identified
through academic literature were categorized based on the descriptions
of utility mechanism. A misreading of the academic literature could lead
to a misunderstanding of the utility leading to inaccurate categorization.
To minimize error, all three economic regime categories have a
minimum of 30 samples.
Privatized utilities were identified through data collected from the
PPI database.45 The PPI collects and publishes data on private
investment in infrastructure projects in developing countries. The PPI
identified which water utilities were involved in a divesture sale or were
actively operating under a concession, management, or lease contract.

45

The World Bank Group, “About the Database - Private Infrastructre Projects - The World Bank &
PPIAF.”
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In total 54 privatized utilities were identified: 2 full divesture sale, 32
concession, 2 management, and 18 lease contracts.
Cases for the remaining two management models were identified
and categorized by utility descriptions found in contemporary academic
literature. For public utilities 53 cases were identified: 20 owned by the
national government and 33 owned by provincial/state entity
government. There were a total of 37 decentralized utilities that were
identified: 34 owned by a municipal entity and three cooperatives.

Measuring Performance
IBNET’s data is collected by participating water utilities selfreporting measurement data on service coverage, water consumption
and production, cost and staffing, and non-revenue water. Data is
reported with the use of the IBNET tool-kit, which is a collection of
spreadsheets requiring specific information.46 The fact that data is
collected through a self-reporting process does bring legitimate
questions of validity to the process. For example, Electrogaz (Rwanda’s
water utility) reported, in 2005, that water coverage was at 119 percent
46

“IBNET Toolkit | IBNET Toolkit | Toolkit Instructions.”
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of the population. This figure could be derived from a misunderstanding
of the reporting process, inexperience, or political pressure to
misrepresent improved performance. This thesis will be leaving such
figures out because of unclear, questionable, or poor description of
criteria.
To minimize the effects of inaccuracies, misrepresentations, and
misunderstandings this thesis used a minimum of 30 samples, gathered
from IBNET data, in a regression model to explore the relationship
between categorized utility’s water coverage and water production, nonrevenue water, and unit operational cost. This thesis has elected to use
water coverage as the dependent variable for several reasons. First, it
measures the percentage of the population within the specific utility’s
service district that has access to water services, including both
household connections and public access water points.47 Second,
coverage provides insight in a nation state’s conception of development
and its implementation through concrete policies. Chapter six of the
United Nations Development Report 3, “Water in a Changing World”
emphasizes how a lack of sustainable water access could inhibit
47

“IBNET Indicators,” 2.
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development.48 Finally, water coverage, unlike the other three
indicators, measures distribution and not production or delivery. The
three independent variables are typically used for benchmarking
effectiveness and efficiency.
The first independent variable, water production, provides insight
into the production side of water access. Water production is measured
by liters per person per day and expresses the total annual water
produced and supplied, by the utility, to the distribution system.49
Regression analysis will measure the strength of the relationship
between an ownership model’s performance in water production and
water coverage. Tracking and measuring this indicator will show which
management models produce higher level of water and if there is an
identifiable relationship between water coverage and water production.
The second independent variable, non-revenue water, will observe
the amount of wasted water produced by sample utilities. Non-revenue
calculates the difference in water produced and water sold in order to
establish how much water is lost within the distribution network before

48
49

The United Nations World Water Development Report 3.
“IBNET Indicators,” 3.
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it reaches the consumer.50 An analysis of water lost can provide insights
into the health of a distribution system and validates or invalidates
critique. Noted earlier, a criticism of publicly managed water utilities is
its failure to curb waste because it is treated as a common good,
whereas privatization gives water an economic value that discourages
waste. Regression analysis measured the strength of the relationship
between an ownership model’s performance in non-revenue water and
water coverage.
The final independent variable, unit operational cost, measured
the health of a utilities infrastructure. Unit operational cost takes the
total operational expenses of water utilities (including staffing,
infrastructure, and maintenance) and divides them by the annual
volume sold to show a “bottom line assessment of the mix of resources
used to achieve the outputs required.”51 This indicator shows how much
it costs to provide water to consumers. Lower costs could indicate a
better performing water delivery system coupled with cost effective
management and staffing. Regression analysis will measure the

50
51

Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 9.
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strength of the relationship between an ownership model’s
performances in unit operational cost and water coverage.

Table 3: IBNET Indicators
Indicator

Performance

Variable Definition

Measure
Water

Water

Coverage

Coverage

Y

Percentage of the population with
access to water services as a
percentage of the total population
under utility’s nominal
responsibility.

Water

Water

Production

Accessibility

X1

Litres/person/day; Total annual
water sold expressed by population
served per day.

Non-Revenue

Waste

X2

Difference between water supplied

Water

and water sold expressed as a
percentage of net water supplied.

Unit

Infrastructure

X3

Annual water service operational

Operational

expenses/Total annual volume

Cost

sold.
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Statistical Analysis
Regression analysis was used to explore statistical relationships
between the water coverage of private, public, and decentralized water
utilities and three independent variables- water production, non-revenue
water, and unit operational cost. This thesis hypothesized that all three
management models would show a relationship between water
coverage and the three independent variables.
This thesis tested that decentralized water systems would have
the most positive impacts on water allocation, infrastructure
improvement and waste reduction. Non-revenue water, water
production, and unit operational cost will be equal or better to
privatization levels and water coverage will be equal or better to publicly
managed utilities.
The hypothesis for privatization asserts that utilities will perform
well in non-revenue water, unit operational cost, and water production.
To evaluate this hypothesis, it must first be shown that privatized
utilities have comparatively lower levels of non-revenue water and
operational costs while maintaining higher levels of water production.
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Public management, compared to privatization and
decentralization, will have less infrastructure investment and higher
levels of waste, and a poorer performance in water allocation. To
validate this hypothesis, analysis must show a lower level of water
coverage and production coupled with higher levels of operational cost
and non-revenue water.

Case Studies
Three case studies were used to explore the more nuanced
internal and external factors that impact the water coverage of utilities
operating in Latin America. This thesis used media reports, academic
literature, and available databases to explore how price, cost recovery,
institutional arrangements (e.g. World Bank Loans), legal frameworks,
utility history, and political environment impact the performance of
Aguas Argentina (AASA) a privatized water utility in Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de São Paulo
(SABESP) a state owned utility in São Paulo, Brazil; and Cooperativa de
Servicios Públicos Santa Cruz (SAGUAPAC) water cooperative in Santa
Cruz, Bolivia. Each case study explored the unique events that have led
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to significant changes in infrastructure, management, and operations
and how these changes impact water coverage.
The three utilities were selected from the regression model case
studies of each categorized property regime. Additionally, the three
utilities were selected from Latin American countries because it is a
region that has a long history with privatization programs. Each case
utility was selected based on the criteria for utility categorization
summarized in Table 2. In addition, each utility was selected because
each has been highlighted in academic literature as a positive example
of a high performing utility.
Complementing regression analysis with these case studies
provides a fuller picture of management models and water coverage.
Statistical analysis will establish, if any, a relationship between water
coverage and management models. The case studies will provide a
more in-depth look at how management models impact or are impacted
by local nuanced factors.
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Results- Multicollinearity and Regression Analysis
Table 4 Management Model Descriptive Means for Performance
Indicators
Water
Production
(l/person/day
)

Nonrevenue
Water
(%
Leakage)

Standardized
2009 Unit
Cost
(US$/m3
sold)

Management
Model

Number
of Cases

Water
Coverage
(% of
Access)

Public

53

77.97%

350.79

37.46%

$0.37

Private

54

87.72%

373.13

38.06%

$0.31

Decentralized

37

91.05%

281.2

33%

$0.51

Total

144

85.38%

339.92

36.43%

$0.38

Working under the assumption that management models do
impact water coverage this thesis hypothesized that all three
management models would show a relationship between water
coverage and the three independent variables with the decentralized
model outperforming the privately and publicly owned models. Data
collected from IBNET on 144 water utilities is averaged and summarized
in table 4 (preceding). The preceding descriptive show that
decentralized utilities on average has higher levels of water coverage
with lower levels of non-revenue water. However, decentralized utilities
have significantly higher unit operational cost. Exploring farther, this
thesis conducted a multiple regression analysis for each ownership type
(private, public, and decentralized) that explored significance between
45

the dependent variable, water coverage, and the three independent
variables- water production, non-revenue water, and unit operational
cost.
Regression analysis established relationships for all three
ownership types, but only for water coverage and one independent
variable. Based on the results both privatized and publicly owned water
utilities have a statistically significant inverse relationship between water
coverage and non-revenue water. Meaning, an increase or decrease in
non-revenue water will result in the opposite reaction of higher or lower
water coverage. There was no significant relationship for water
production and unit operational cost with water coverage. For
decentralized water utilities there was significance between water
coverage and unit operational cost. Increased unit operational cost
correlates with higher water coverage. There was no statistically
significant relationship established with the other two variables- water
production and non-revenue water.

Multicollinearity Results
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A multicollinearity test was run to explore possible linkages
between the three independent variables- water production, nonrevenue water, and unit operational cost. A weak level inverse
correlation of multicollinearity was found between water production and
non-revenue water (Pearson’s r= -.40; sig= .00). A possible
explanation of this is that water production involves water moving
through a utility’s infrastructure. Non-revenue water measures water
leaking out of a utility’s infrastructure. There was no multicollinearity
detected between water production and unit operational cost (Pearson’s
r= -.15; sig= .08). Additionally, there was no multicollinearity detected
between non-revenue water and unit operational cost (Pearson’s r= .11; sig= .19).
Table 5: Multicollinearity Findings using Pearson’s r
N=144
Water
Production
Nonrevenue
Water
Unit
Operational
Cost

Water
NonProduction revenue
Water
1
.40**

Unit
Operational
Cost
-0.15

0.40**

1

.11

-0.15

.11

1

Note* p < 0.05
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Source: IBNET

One Way ANOVA
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to establish significance
regards to management models and water variables- water coverage,
water production, unit cost, and non-revenue water. If significance is
established there is the possibility that type of management model
impacts water variables. If no significance is established there is the
possibility that ownership models do not impact water variables. Three
of the four water variables showed significance. Non-revenue water
shows no significance (F= .28, p= 0.76). This is interesting because
privatization and decentralization both have discussions on why nonrevenue water would be impacted under each ownership model.
Table 6 ANOVA analysis of management models and water
variables
Constant

F

Sig.

Water Coverage

18.41

0.00

Water Production
Non-revenue
Unit Cost

5.95
.28
20.03

0.03
0.76
0.00

Note* p < 0.05
Source: IBNET
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Regression- Privatized Water Utilities
Multiple regression analysis of privatized water utilities was used
to investigate significance between water coverage and water
production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost (adjusted
R2=.308, F=8.857, p<.05). This thesis hypothesized that there would
be a significant relationship (or better) between water coverage and
water production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost.
Analysis showed an inverse relationship between water coverage and
non-revenue water (standardized β= -.684, p=.00). There was no
significant relationship for water production (standardized β= .267,
p=.06) and unit operational cost (standardized β= -.083, p=.47).
Table 7: Regression results of private water utility’s water
access and independent variables
Constant

Standardized
Sig.
Beta
(N=54)

Water Production

.267

.06

Non-revenue Water
Unit operational
cost

-.684

.00*

-.083

.47

Note* Adjusted R2=0.308, F Stat= 8.857, p < 0.05
Source: IBNET
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Regression- Publicly Owned Water Utilities
Multiple regression analysis of public water utilities investigated
significance between water coverage and water production, nonrevenue water, and unit operational cost (adjusted R2=. 113, F=3.201,
p<.05). This thesis hypothesized there would be significant relationship
between water coverage and water production, non-revenue water, and
unit operational cost. Analysis showed an inverse relationship between
water coverage and non-revenue water (standardized β= -.481, p=.01).
There was no significant relationship for water production (standardized
β= .113, p=.46) and unit operational cost (standardized β= -.249,
p=.10).

Table 8: Regression results of public water utility’s water
access and independent variables
Constant

Standardized
Sig.
Beta (N=53)

Water Production

.113

.46

Non-revenue Water
Unit operational
cost

-.481

.01*

.249

.10

Note* Adjusted R2=.113, F Stat= 3.201, p < 0.05
Source: IBNET
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Regression- Decentralized Water Utilities
Multiple regression analysis of decentralized water utilities was
used to investigate the relationship between water coverage and water
production, non-revenue water, and unit operational cost (adjusted
R2=. 094, F=2.245, p<.05). This thesis hypothesized that there would
be the relationship between water coverage and water production, nonrevenue water, and unit operational cost. Analysis showed significant
relationship between water coverage and unit operational cost
(standardized β= .383, p=.03). There was no significant relationship for
water production (standardized β= .288, p=.09) and non-revenue water
(standardized β= .086, p=.60).
Table 9: Regression results of decentralized water utility’s
water access and independent variables
Constant

Standardized
Sig.
Beta (N=37)

Water Production

.288

.09

Non-revenue Water
Unit operational
cost

.086

.60

.383

.03*

Note* Adjusted R2=.094, F Stat= 2.245, p< 0.05
Source: IBNET

Summary
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Regression analysis showed that there is the possibility that at
some level management models can impact water coverage. For
publicly and privately owned water utilities, plugging leaks can translate
into high rates of water coverage. For decentralized water utilities high
levels of unit operational cost can increase water coverage. Regression
analysis also shows that broad claims about ownership, efficiency, and
improved water coverage should be suspect. Not one ownership model
established significant relationship between water coverage and all three
independent variables.
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Privatization: The Buenos Aires Water Concession
In 1993, the Buenos Aires public water utility, Obras Sanitarias de
la Nación (OSN), was privatized as a 30-year concession contract and
awarded to the private water consortium Aguas Argentina (AASA).
Privatization was implemented with the goal of achieving universal water
coverage through efficiency gains and full cost recovery. AASA
continuously failed to meet performance targets, which led to the
renationalization of the utility in 2006. This section presents an analysis
of the AASA privatization case study and argues that the concession
collapsed because a rushed privatization process established institutions
that failed to mediate the unique challenges created by local historical,
political, geographic, and economic factors.

Service Area
The city of Buenos Aires is a federally administered autonomous
district located within Buenos Aires province on the southern side of the
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Rio de la Plato from which the city draws 92 percent of its fresh water.52
The city itself includes the Capital District (the core) and 24 surrounding
municipalities, often referred to as the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region
(BAMR). AASA service area only includes the Capital District and 17
surrounding municipalities, servicing (at the time of concession) a
population of 9.3 million.53 When this thesis refers to Buenos Aires it is
in reference to this service area and not the greater metropolitan
region.54
This case study begins by contextualizing the Buenos Aires service
area and its political environment. This will be followed by a discussion
of how the political environment of the late 1980s and early 1990s
impacted the privatization process. Finally, this thesis will discuss how a
rushed privatization process contributed to weak governance that was
advantageous for AASA.

Historical Context
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Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, “The Buenos Aires Water Concession,” 3. The remaining 8 percent is
provided by wells.
53
Loftus and McDonald, “Of Liquid Dreams,” 186. At privatization the population of service area was
8.6 million. It expanded to 9.3 million with the inclusion of Quilmes municipality in 1995.
54
Please see map in Appendix A.
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During the 18th century and early 19th century, in most European
cities, water access was provided by private companies or municipalities.
However, the industrial revolution coupled with population growth
outpaced their capabilities of providing potable drinking water.
Commonly, these cities’ water systems were polluted, stagnant, and a
breeding for water borne illness. Frequent epidemics of malaria,
cholera, typhoid complemented with scientific exploration of water
borne illness led to a re-thinking on water management. Over the late
19th and early 20th century the concept that maintaining healthy water
systems decreased epidemics gained consensus. Water needed to be
cleaned, it needed to be running, and it needed to be protected from
waste. This was an investment well beyond just building sewers and
laying water pipes. This re-thinking was a significant change in urban
planning and required investment well beyond the capabilities of private
companies or municipal governments. The state was the only actor
capable of financing the modernization of water infrastructure. By the
20th century, in most European cities, the state is the main actor in
financing, regulating, and managing water. A notable exception is
France where the state partnered with private water companies and
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subsidized the modernization of their water systems- a point that is
reviewed later in this section.55
Hall and Lobina note that in the colonies the development of water
systems differed- colonial policies limited water access to colonial elites
while native populations were charged at full cost recovery prices.56
For Argentina, the colonial history has played a significant role in
shaping the water politics of Buenos Aires. It contributed to ‘canilla
libre’ (translation: all you can use), a principle belief that water service
should be provided by the state. After independence the concept of
public water became associated with independence, while payment for
water was associated with colonialism. 57
The Argentinean government established OSN in 1912 with the
original responsibility of managing and expanding all urban area’s water
and sanitation services. Buenos Aires experienced decades of service
expansion, but, economic mismanagement and canilla libre inhibited
adequate cost recovery, and expansion stalled in the 1950 until
privatization began in 1993. In 1983, with stalled expansion, poor cost

55
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Goubert and others, The Conquest of Water.
Hall, Lobina, and others, “Water as a Public Service,” 6.
Schneier-Madanes, “From Well to Network,” 46.
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recovery, and a debt crisis –referred to as the lost decade– the
Argentinean government, under pressure from the IMF and World Bank,
decentralized OSN.58 The responsibility of water and sanitation services
was passed on to the provincial governments. Consequently, as Botton
and Gouvello argue, the decentralization of OSN created access barriers
within the concession area. Decentralization created two different
utilities, OSN (federally owned) and Aguas Bonarenses (provincially
owned), within the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan region. In both
service areas, peripheral municipalities, like Buenos Aires’ Alimirante
Brown, had lower access levels compared to centralized municipalities
with higher access levels.59 Incidentally, periphery areas also had
higher levels of poverty than centrally located areas like the Capital
District.60 As will be touched on later, fragmentation created challenges
to service expansion in the periphery municipalities.
Issues of fragmentation and cost recovery were not address
during the 1980s. The newly elected Alfonsin government, responding
to the debt crisis, prioritized debt repayment at the expense of public
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Ibid., 47–48.
Please see Map 2 (Appendix B).
Botton and Gouvello, “Water and Sanitation in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region.”
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works. This negligence led to infrastructure underinvestment,
deterioration, and up to 45 percent of water loss due to infrastructure
leakage.61 By 1993, one-third of Buenos Aires service area connections
were unregistered, customers frequently did not receive or pay utility
bills, and 68 percent of collected revenue was from business and
industries that represented 2 percent of OSN’s customer base.62 By the
end of the 1980s the debt crisis escalated, which resulted in a loss of
confidence in traditional economic policy solutions and an electorate
clamoring for a new economic direction.

The Push for Privatization
The loss of confidence in the Alfonsin administration created an
opportunity for proponents of privatization, both internal and external to
Argentina, to push market oriented policies. External actors, most are
from Argentina’s foreign creditors, including the IMF and the World
Bank, pushed privatization through two approaches. The first was
through experts who argued Argentina’s inefficient public sector
crowded out the private sector and inhibited economic recovery. The
61
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Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, “The Buenos Aires Water Concession,” 4.
Porporato and Robbins, “Privatisation and Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies,” 196.
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solution came in the form of a set of economic proposals -commonly
referred to as the Washington Consensus- that reduced the public
sector, deregulated the economy, and removed barriers to foreign
trade.63 The second approach was that global lending institutions used
previous foreign debt and future loans to pressure Argentina into
accepting market oriented policy solution.64 Victoria Murillo argues that
because of an atmosphere of elevated external financial pressure voters
were more accepting of privatization programs.65 During the 1989
general election the voting public viewed privatization programs
favorably. In Buenos Aires, 16 percent of the population opposed
privatization.66 Running on a privatization platform, Carlos Menem, a
candidate from the Peronist party, was elected president.
Menem’s economic agenda began with combating the 3,080
percent hyperinflation by artificially pegging the value of the
Argentinean peso to the US dollar. It was believed that by artificially
linking the peso to the dollar it would enhance the credibility of the
currency, which lowered the perceived risk of investing in Argentina’s
63
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65
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Baer and Montes-Rojas, “From Privatization to Re-Nationalization,” 325.
Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, 222.
Murillo, “Political Bias in Policy Convergence,” 464–467.
Alcázar, Abdala, and Shirley, “The Buenos Aires Water Concession,” 12.
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private companies.67 Next, the Menem administration pushed through
the National Administrative Reform Law (No 23, 696) and presidential
decrees 2074/90, 1443/91, and 2408/91 authorizing the full, or partial,
privatization of all state owned enterprises in the form of concession
contracts.68 Following this, over 115 SOEs were privatized between
1990 and 1994.69 Privatizing OSN began in 1991 by making the utility
financially appealing to bidders. In February of 1991, tariffs increased
by 25 percent and by another 29 percent in April.70 Two years later, in
May 1993, Aguas Argentina, through a competitive bidding process, won
the concession contract with a proposed tariff reduction of 26.9 percent.
AASA is a consortium of organizations led by the largest
shareholder, the French water company Suez.71 A breakdown of AASA
investors shows a consortium consisting primarily of large international
organizations with a significant amount of resources and influence. The
exception is the 10 percent ownership by the employees.

Failed Privatization
67
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Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, 221.
Loftus and McDonald, “Of Liquid Dreams,” 182–183.
Estache and Trujillo, “Privatization in Latin America The Good, the Ugly, and the Unfair,” 1.
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At the time of purchase Suez was Lyonnaise des Eaux, became Suez after a merger in 1997.

60

AASA’s 26.9 percent tariff reduction was to be offset through
efficiency gains and waste reductions. Immediately following
privatization, AASA –with the union’s cooperation- used early retirement
programs to reduce the workforce by 50 percent.72 Additionally, AASA
decreased non-revenue water from pre-privatization levels of 45 percent
to 32 percent by 2001.73 However, despite such efficiency gains AASA
failed to meet performance goals established in the concession contract
because the economic geography and water politics74 of the concession
area made expansion unprofitable in certain municipalities.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s proponents of water
privatization promoted the French model for water service management.
This model was founded on a public-private partnership formalized
through a concession contract, and greatly influenced the design of the
AASA concession contract. The model has been operating and
developing since the 1850s. Pezon argues that French model
concessions often fail because conditions for success are unique to
France and difficult to replicate in other areas. In particular, French
72
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Rudo et al., Aguas Argentina 1998-1999 Capital Investment Program, 5.
“IBNET Indicators.”
The term ‘water politics’ refers to community beliefs like canilla libre.
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concessions in the 19th century were originally based on a principle of
full cost recovery; however, this principle failed to generalize water
access and was abandoned in the 20th century for concessions that
implemented public financing.75 For Buenos Aires, this lesson was
overlooked and its concession contract was based on a principal of full
cost recovery, which was challenged by fragmentation, canilla libre,
information asymmetries, and a weak regulator.
AASA’s concession contract established a tariff regime that
included price cap and cost plus pricing schemes creating a
contradictory and inefficient tariff regime. A price cap scheme –often
used by utilities in France and Britain- sets a price ceiling for the utility
but then creates artificial competition by forcing the utility to earn
profits through efficiency gains. The cost plus pricing allowed AASA to
renegotiate its tariff cap when the firm’s operational cost increases by 7
percent.76 As shown in the following paragraphs, information
asymmetries allowed AASA to circumvent the price cap because it
provided the firm the opportunity to increase tariff charges through
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property reclassification. The price cap mechanism was further
undermined because of a weak regulator. AASA was able to renegotiate
several tariff increases.
The regulator Ente Tripartito de Obras de Servicios de
Saneamiento (ETOSS) was created to monitor AASA service expansion,
the quality of service, and establish tariff rates.77 At the time of
establishment, ETOSS was staffed with about 70 former OSN
employees, mostly engineers and technicians. 78 Very few had the skills,
knowledge, and experience required for a regulator, such as economics,
law, and accounting.79 This lack of experience was most problematic
with regards to setting tariff rates, a holdover from OSN. This was
mostly because reforming the tariff would take time, and changes ran
the risk of discouraging potential investors.80 The inherited rate also
had different pricing structures for metered and non-metered
customers. The pricing structure differences between metered and non-
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metered customers are significant because it enabled AASA’s
opportunistic price inflation.
Metered customers represented a small portion of connections,
about 8 percent in 1995.81 For the most part, this was due to decades
of canilla libre coupled with meter installation charges implemented after
privatization. For metered customers, the pricing formula was:
MTij = 0.5 * BBTij + Pi * K * (C - Ã)
MTij and BBTij define the type of service and customer category. (C Ã) is a pricing scheme that allowed for a flat rate for zero marginal cost
for the first 30m3. After 30m3 the consumer is then charged $0.33m3 for
water services only, or $0.66 for water and sewage services.82 A
consumer was allowed to switch from un-metered to metered service,
however additional connection charges and meter reading cost typically
served as a financial deterrent for switching to metered service.83
The non-metered pricing scheme lacked a flat rate mechanism and
contained variables that allowed for AASA to inflate customer cost. The
formula for non-metered service is:
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BBTij = GTij * K * Z * (SC * E + ST/10)
A similarity in both formulas was a mechanism used to adjust tariffs that
was represented by K. For metered connections the variable K was
calculated with variable C, which measured consumption and was
mechanically measured by a meter that could be checked by consumers
and ETOSS. For non-metered customers the variables Z and E are
coefficients that vary dependent on property age and location.84
Together, the variables K, C, E established a pricing scheme -often
referred to as the K factor- that is dependent upon property
characteristics. The K factor was often inaccurate because Buenos Aires
lacked a strong legal property system capable of defining private
property. In addition, OSN failed to maintain an updated property
database leading to a lack of information about property within the
service area.85
After privatization AASA, through field surveys and aerial
photography, updated resident information. With an updated database
AASA had an information advantage over ETOSS in the renegotiation of
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tariff increases to reclassified residents. First, identified commercial
property was reclassified from residential to industrial, increasing cost
by 1.9 times.86 Next, AASA reclassified customers based on the age or
value of their property, typically resulting in higher water bills for the
reclassified resident. Finally, AASA reclassified customers from
residential to non-residential, a classification that typically doubled their
water bill.87
In addition to reclassification, in 1994, AASA also negotiated with
ETOSS a 13.5 percent tariff increase. Despite the tariff increase the
average water bill was about $16.53, which was still lower than 1993
OSN tariff charge of $19.40.88 However, with privatization came the
implementation of two new access charges for newly connected
residents. The first, called connection fee (CF), was an upfront charge
of $335 to gain access to the water grid. The second, infrastructure
charge (IC), was a $785 fee (payable in installments) used to pay for
network expansion and was only charged to new customers after work
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was completed.89 For customers who could not afford access fees AASA
was required to help with financing. The CF and IC placed the cost of
service expansion onto new connections.90 The cost burden to new
customers played a significant role in causing AASA to fall short of
performance goals.
Table 10: Concession Contract Service Performance Targets
% of Population Coverage
Target Year

Water

Sewage

1993 (0)

70

58

1998 (5)

81

64

2003 (10)

90

73

2013 (20)

97

82

2023 (30)

100

90

Source: Idelovitch, E. and Ringskog, K. Private Sector in Water Supply and
Sanitation in Latin America.

Stretched over the 30-year concession period AASA was required
to meet performance targets for service expansion, network renovation,
and decreasing non-revenue water. AASA needed to expand water
89
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coverage, from 70 percent (roughly 6 million) of residents in 1993, to 81
percent (increase of 1.3 million) by 1998.91 Initially, Aguas Argentina
expanded water service by 949 thousand residents and sanitation
service by 279 thousand residents. For the first 5-year performance
target AASA was about 28 percent (382,000) short of target for water
connections and about 70 percent (650,000) short of target in
sanitation.92 One reason for this shortfall is AASA expanded into areas
with higher income stream. Typically, these areas were closer to the
service area’s center, had high population density and low poverty
levels. Because expansion was being financed through new connections
AASA typically avoided periphery municipalities with low population and
high levels of poverty.93 AASA delays in expansion of services ETOSS
began in 1996 to levy fines against the firm.94 In addition to these
fines, AASA also suffered financially because customers refused to pay
their water bills – a cost AASA estimated to be at 30 million.95
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In 1997, mostly because of canilla libre and ETOSS fines AASA
pushed for contract renegotiation. ETOSS’s board of directors
superseded the regulator and approved renegotiation. The six-member
board of directors was filled with political appointees (significantly
influenced by the Menem administration) drawn from the national,
provincial, and municipal levels of government.96 By 1997, the AASA
concession had become a political liability to the Menem administration
that had an invested interest in ensuring the success of privatization.97
ETOSS was left out of renegotiations and the Ministry of Economy, the
Department of Natural Resources, and Aguas Argentina carried out
negotiations.98
Renegotiations produced significant changes in pricing and service
expansion. First, the ETOSS fines against AASA were dropped and
service expansion targets were relaxed. Most significantly, IC charges
were dropped and CF charges were lowered to $120 spread out over a
five-year period in $4 bi-monthly charges. IC charges were replaced
with a $4.00 universal charge to all customers called the “Servicio
96
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Universal y Mejora Ambiental” (Universal Service and Environmental
Improvement), commonly referred to as SUMA. The renegotiated
payment scheme lowered cost for new connections by 18 percent
($26.65 monthly before renegotiation to $22.53 monthly after). For
connected residents their monthly payments increased 24 percent, from
$16.53 to $20.53.99 The logic to the new price scheme was to
implement cross-subsidization to spread out the cost of expansion
throughout the service area. Solutions reached in renegotiation were
focused on cost and price. Renegotiation sidelined ETOSS and furthered
weakened it institutionally. Additionally, renegotiation failed to address
the information asymmetries between AASA and ETOSS.100
Despite renegotiation and tariff changes AASA still failed to meet
its 2003 performance goals for both water (84 percent coverage) and
sanitation (63 percent coverage).101 This shortfall was largely due to
AASA exposure to the global market; specifically tariffs being linked to
US dollars. As noted earlier, Menem’s administration pegged the
Argentinean peso to the US dollar in 1989, sowing the seeds of
99
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economic turmoil a decade later. External economic shock such as the
1997 East Asian crisis, slumping commodity prices and financial turmoil
in Brazil sent Argentina’s economy into a tailspin in 2000. The economic
crisis sent unemployment soaring past 20 percent and reduced
Argentina’s GDP by 12 percent. Furthermore, because the peso was
pegged to the US dollar it was appreciating in value. As a result,
Argentina’s exports increased in price while imports decreased.102 In
2002, interim President Eduardo Duhalde, who replaced Menem’s
successor Fernando de la Rúa-, pushed through the ‘Economic
Emergency Law’ removing the peso’s tie to the dollar, which quickly
decreased in value to 1 dollar = 3.5 pesos.103 The devaluation of the
pesos resulted in a $500 million dollar loss for AASA, destroying the
firm’s net-worth. Further complicating matters for AASA, the Duhalde
administration instituted tariffs freezes in 2003, dashing AASA hopes of
tariff increases to recover loss.104 Following this SUEZ pushed to cut its
losses and sell its share, however, with economic instability there were
few takers. In 2005, Suez decided to walk away from AASA and in
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March 2006 the private water company was renationalized forming the
public company Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos S.A.

AASA Summary
Before 1990, water access for OSN was below 70 percent of the
service area’s users. The utility’s infrastructure was underinvested and
deteriorating- water leakage was about 47 percent. The IMF, World
Bank, and Argentina’s foreign creditors pushed privatization as a
solution. The AASA privatization is an example of the oversimplification
of challenges to water access. AASA failed because rushed privatization
neglected local historical, political, and economic factors all of which
created unique challenges to service provision and expansion.
Furthermore, this rushed process created weak water governance that
failed to curtail the opportunistic behavior of AASA.
The concession contract required AASA to meet expansion targets
every five years. AASA did not succeed in meeting these performance
targets for two reasons- first; any service expansion was mostly
concentrated into areas with identifiable revenue. A significant reason
for this was because expansion, at first, was financed through charges
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to new connections. Areas without identifiable revenue were typically
located on the periphery of the service area and had higher levels of
poverty. Second, the weak governance structure established by the
rushed privatization process failed to mediate obstacles to expansion
posed by local factors such as ‘canilla libre’. Renegotiation only
weakened the regulator further and resulted in market solutions that
failed to address canilla libre.
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Public Ownership: Water and Sanitation in São Paulo
The Brazilian water and sanitation utility the Companhia de
Saneamento Basico do Estado de São Paulo (SABESP) is a public
corporation and is primarily owned by the state of São Paulo.
Established in 1973, SABESP was created through government
development programs aimed at establishing and strengthening state
owned water and sanitation companies. SABESP was established during
a period of exponential industrial growth and chaotic urbanization in São
Paulo. Noted by Silva and discussed later in this section, during the
1970’s and early 1980’s SABESP largely prioritized water coverage to
support São Paulo growing industrial demands. In doing so SABESP
neglected expanding service coverage in low-income and impoverished
neighborhoods.105 Today, SABESP is often used by academics and
practitioners as an example of a high performing state owned water
utility. It has a reputation for efficiency, well regarded for service
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delivery, often maintains full cost recovery, and water coverage is nearly
universal.106
This thesis argues that the rise of democracy in Brazil played a
significant role in SABESP’s success in expanding services. In 1985,
Brazil’s military regime collapsed, opening the door for national
democracy. With the rise of democracy, a grassroots protest from
residents of São Paulo’s shanty towns, commonly referred to as favelas,
pushed for service expansion into their communities. Protest
encouraged the implementation of SABESP’s Recovery Program- a fiscal,
administrative, and operational streamlining, credited for improving
operational efficiency, reducing non-revenue water, and achieving full
cost recovery. The Recovery Program provided SABESP with the
economic feasibility to maintain and continue service expansion.

Service Area
SABESP is one of the world’s largest water and sanitation utilities
providing water to the entire state of São Paulo. São Paulo is located on
Brazil’s southeast coast and is surrounded by the state of Rio de Janeiro
106
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to the north, Paraná to the south, and Minas Gerais to the north and
west. Together these five states constitute Brazil’s most economically
developed, diverse, and productive region. However, São Paulo is
Brazil’s wealthiest and most populated state. Its population is
approximately 43 million inhabitants and the state accounts for 33
percent of Brazil’s GDP-107
SABESP provides water service to approximately 23.6 million and
sewage service to approximately 20 million consumers. Its service area
is separated into two-regions- the Regional Systems and the
Metropolitan Region of Sao Paulo (MRSP). The Regional System is
geographically larger and encompasses 343 municipalities, most of
which are rural. The MRSP is demographically larger and services the
city of São Paulo (the state’s capital) and the surrounding 27
municipalities- approximately 20.4 million residents. As of 2010, the
MRSP contained 46 percent of the state’s population and is one of the
most densely populated urban areas in the world. The MRSP represents
SABESP’s core market.
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Historical Context
Beginning in the 1960’s the state of São Paulo experienced
exponential population and economic growth. Drawn by employment
prospects, many rural Brazilians migrated to the MRSP to fill low-income
industrial positions. In 1965, the MRSP encompassed 550km2 and had a
population of approximately 6.5 million Paulistas. By 1980, MRSP’s
population grew to 12.6 million within MRSP’s geographically expanded
900km2 area.109 Discussed in the following the MRSP’s high decades
long growth rate nearly double the city area because of continued
migration to the periphery. From 1970 to 1991 the MRSP averaged a
three percent growth rate, but the growth was disproportionately
distributed throughout the region. São Paulo City, MRSP’s core,
averaged an annual growth rate of 2.3 percent. Comparatively, MRSP’s
peripheral growth rate was around 4.7 percent.110 The periphery’s
higher growth rate is attributed to its lower-cost of living. During the
1980’s property values in Sao Paulo were high, and a relaxation of
rental laws allowed rental property owners to regularly increase rental
109
110
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fees, which dis-incentivized affordable rental housing. The increases in
rent and property value raised the cost of living in the MRSP’s core, and
pushed the metropolitan area’s growing poor population to the
periphery municipalities.111
Additionally, the lack of enforcement of environmental laws
allowed favelas to encroach upon the sources of the state’s freshwater
supply. Protective measures, in the form of area-based regulations,
were instituted by the state in 1975 and 1976. The regulations were
intended to prevent development from occurring within critical
watersheds. Poor enforcement within the protected areas allowed for
their illegal occupations, which lead to high population growth and
subsequent severe pollution within the watershed.112 In 1971, the
population living in favelas was approximately 41,000 Paulistas, which
rose to approximately 1.9 million by 1993.113

Resistance to Water and Sewage Service Expansion
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In 1971, approximately 20 percent of favelas received water
service and less than 1 percent received sewage service. By 1987,
water service to the favelas had grown exponentially, to approximately
99 percent.114 While one might conclude that the establishment of
SABESP significantly contributed to favela service expansion, this would
be an oversimplification. Argued below, Brazil’s military government, in
partnership with the government of São Paulo established a state-supply
model that prioritized support for Brazil’s rapidly growing industrial
demands. SABESP prioritized service delivery and expansion to
accommodate São Paulo growing industrial needs. This prioritization
came at the expense of the rapidly growing favelas resulting in a lack of
water access. Furthermore, SABESP resisted service expansion into the
favelas. The expansion of service into favelas resulted when a shift in
political regimes allowed for greater civic influence on the
aforementioned institutions and São Paulo’s water governance.
In 1971, Brazil’s military regime implemented the Plano Nacional
de Saneament Basico (PLANSA), a national plan that centralized water
and sewage services. PLANSA used a mixture of tax revenues and
114
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federal backed loans to consolidate smaller municipal water and sewage
companies into larger state owned utilities.115 Under PLANSA, SABESP
was established through the centralization of São Paulo’s water and
sanitation municipal companies- COMPASP, SAEC, and SANESP.
Furthermore, SABESP was established as a public corporation with the
requirement that the state of São Paulo own two-thirds the utility’s
voting-shares.116
During the 1970’s and early 80’s service expansion into the favelas
was impeded by SABESP and government. Brazil’s ruling military regime
launched PLANSA to support Brazil’s rapidly increasing industrial needs,
and not develop universal household access. PLANSA’s water and
sewage services became a state supply model that favored industrial
centers over low in-come centers.117 São Paulo’s government did not
want to extend public services to favelas because they were viewed as
illegal settlements. Public service to land occupations would have
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legitimized the illegal communities.118 SABESP argued that expanding
service in the favelas had high technical and engineering challenges that
would be too costly to implement. SABESP engineering and
infrastructure standards were aligned with consolidated organized urban
areas like São Paulo city. Unlike these areas, the favelas were
disorganized, crowded, and often built on steep hills, flood plains, or
along waterways. Despite national, state, and SABESP’s resistance to
favela service expansion; these marginalized communities experienced a
32 percent increase in water and sewage services by 1980. This
continued to climb, reaching 98 percent by 1987.119 Argued in the
following, much of this service increase can be attributed to the gradual
democratization of Brazil, beginning in the late 70’s.

Civic Movements and Service Expansion
After the 1964 coup, the newly empowered military regime
implemented a variety of new laws to consolidate power and erode
democratic institutions. One such law only allowed two national political
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parties- the National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) and the Movimiento
Democrático Brasiliero (MDB). ARENA was the conservative party and
favored by the military government. The MDB was the liberal party and
was formed out of the consolidation of the Brazilian Labor and Social
Democratic parties. Despite the existence of the MDB party Brazil’s
government mostly operated as a one party system. National, state,
and municipal positions –including President, governors, and mayorswere appointed by senior military leaders and given rubberstamped
approval by the ARENA controlled congress.120 However, in 1974 this
political control began to erode. The newly appointed President General
Ernesto Geisel, began a program of gradual re-democratization- often
referred to the as the abuerta (opening) or the decompression.121
Essential, the abuerta was a rollback of laws limiting media and political
opposition. This rollback helped to increase the influence of the MDB,
forcing ARENA candidates to compete for votes.122
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In São Paulo in the early 70’s, faveledos (favela residents) began
to protest for changes in property laws, infrastructure improvements,
and access to public service- such as water, sewage, and electricity.
The faveledos movement often used non-violent protest targeted at
both municipal and state government institutions and public service
providers- like SABESP. For example, in one protest in 1984- faveledos
marched on SABESP headquarter delivering buckets of stagnant water
from the favelas. Such protests played a significant role in pressuring
ARENA candidates to institute more progressive policies towards the
favelas.123
In 1979, the City of São Paulo’s new mayor, Reynaldo de Barros
(ARENA candidate), charged the Bureau of Social Welfare (COBES) and
the Municipal Development Agency (EMURB) with expanding urban
services into local favelas. The municipal agency’s launched
PROFAVELA, a pilot program designed to provide favelas with water,
sewage, electricity, storm drains, and retention walls. Specifically for
water, PROFAVELA was limited in scope. For the first three years, the
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pilot program impacted 26 favelas (three percent of favelas) providing
approximately 14,200 water connections.124
Despite impacting only three percent of favelas, PROFAVELA was a
significant step in SABESP service expansion. It served as an incubator
for innovation in water service expansion and facilitated institutional
change at SABESP. PROFAVELA worked with civic organizations to
pioneer new construction techniques that are more adaptable to the
favelas chaotic layout. For example, the incorporation of a high-density
polyethylene pipe (PEAD) allowed for the expansion of water services
into the narrow winding streets of the favelas. PEAD was fairly
inexpensive, light-weight, and most importantly flexible enough to
navigate the chaotic favela landscape.125 Favela civic organization
played an active role in the PROFAVELA program. First, favela residents
monitored the quality of the expansion work; rejecting poor quality
installation. Second, favela residents formed volunteer work brigades
that assisted by pre-digging trenches for ground water pipes. The work
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brigades helped to reduce the timeline of service expansion and its
construction cost.126
COBES and EMURB, for the most part, spearheaded PROFAVALA.
SABESP was an unenthusiastic participant. Both COBES and EMURB
worked to convince SABESP to lower its engineering standards and
accept a PEAD water infrastructure. Under a formal agreement SABESP
agreed to provide service to the 14,200 new water connections with the
caveat that the municipality covered the expansion cost.127 PROFAVELA
was SABESP first experience with providing service to the favelas.
Institutionally the utility maintained its resistance to servicing the
favelas; however, this would change with Brazil’s continued
democratization.
In 1982, Franco Montoro, candidate of the newly formed Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)128 won São Paulo’s first open
democratic gubernatorial election. Initially, Governor Montoro did not
respond to the favelado protest. In response, protestors continued
marches on the governor’s mansion, the state capital, and SABESP
126
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headquarters. In 1985, Governor Montoro finally responded by
replacing SABESP’s president. The new president used SABESP’s
employees connected with PROFAVELA to expand water and sewage
service to all favelas within the utility’s service area. Under SABESP’s
new leadership, with the assistances of the favela work teams, and the
use of PROFAVELA construction techniques- piped water service
expanded to 99 percent of favelas by the end of the decade.129

Democratization, Clientelism, and the Recovery Program
During the 1980’s Brazil suffered from hyperinflation brought on
by high external debts and low growth resulting in a decrease of the
availability and effectiveness of federal funds.130 While federal funding
was decreasing the state of São Paulo’s spending increased. A decrease
in federal funds and the roll back of the military regime resulted in a
decentralization of power to the states. Governance at the state level
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was plagued by clientelism and rent seeking behavior, which led to the
manipulation of state owned companies and banks.131
São Paulo’s governing administrations used the states’ two
commercial banks- BANESPA and Nossa Caixa- to provide loans to the
state treasury and state owned companies. Frequently, SABESP was
used to take out loans from the BANESPA or Nossa Caixa to cover the
government’s budget short falls. Such loans were used for government
spending unrelated to SABESP.132 During the late 80’s and early 90’s
SABESP’s water infrastructure decayed. Non-revenue water increased
and service quality deteriorated. By 1994, six million consumers located
in the MRSP frequently experienced water rationing. Additionally, in
that year, a currency crisis of Brazil’s Cruzeiro led to collapse and federal
takeover of BANESPA and Nossa Caixa. The collapse of São Paulo’s
commercial banks revealed that SABESP was R$223 million (USD$232
million) in debt and had an immediate liquidity problem.133
In 1995, Saõ Paulo’s incoming governor Mário Covas and SABESP
implemented policies to improve operational efficiency, reduce cost, and
131
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increase revenue. First, the government of São Paulo addressed
SABESP’s liquidity problem by providing a capital injection of R$800
million. Second, SABESP began selling company shares on the Brazilian
Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) resulting in an additional R$507 million of
revenue in by 1998.134 Third, SABESP reduced its workforce from
20,516 in 1994 to 19,340 in 1998, while at the same time increasing
connection per employee from 330 to 440.135 Finally, SABESP
implemented a new tariff that increased revenue by including service
charges to new connection in the favelas. SABESP tariff structure uses
a progressive block pricing structure that prices households based on
economic status. SABESP’s tariff has two separate consumer categoriesresidential and non-residential. Non-residential consumers are
commercial, industrial, and governmental users. Residential consumers
are domestic households that are further categorized as standard
residential, social136, and favela; the latter two are classifications created
for the benefit of low-income137 consumers.138 The categories are used
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to identify customers price levels based on a progressive block pricing
system. SABESP’s 2004 block pricing uses tier groupings with price
increases as consumption increases. Both non-residential and standard
residential have higher prices per tier group and have only 4 tier groups
compared to the low-income categories 5 tier groups. The purpose is
that Non-residential and standard residential consumption and pricing
levels are designed to bring in higher revenue in order to offset service
and connection cost to both social and favela consumers.139 Changes
implemented in the Recovery Program helped SABESP go from a net
profit loss of R$223 million in 1994 to a net profit of R$25 million in
1995 and R$542.1 million in 1998. Additionally, SABESP’s improved
fiscal situation allowed the utility access to foreign loans.140
During the Recovery Program Brazil’s economy improved. From
1991 to 1994 Brazil’s currency the Cruzeiro was averaging and inflation
rate of 2,375 percent.141 This was the economic environment that
contributed to the collapse of BANESPA and Nossa Caixa. In 1994,
Brazil introduced the Plano Real, an economic stabilization plan that
138
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reasserted the federal government’s fiscal authority. Failing Banks like
Nossa Caixa and BANESPA were taken over by the federal government
effectively ending the revolving door of disguised loans from state banks
to state governments. Additionally, the Plano Real also introduced a
new currency called the ‘Real’. Within two years Brazil’s inflation rate
fell to an annual rate of 20 percent.142 The Plano Real helped to create
a stable economic environment that allowed for SABESP to access
foreign financial markets, attain lower rate loans, and establish longterm construction contracts.
With the Recovery Program and Brazil’s improve economy SABESP
repaired its aging infrastructure, increased water processing capacity,
and expanded service coverage. By the end of 1995 water service
coverage expanded from 84 percent to 91 percent.143 Since, SABESP
has maintained nearly universal levels of water coverage- most recent
95 percent in 2011.144

SABESP Summary
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Under a military regime SABESP was focused on providing water
to support industrialization. However, Saõ Paulo growing economy
attracted migrant’s seeking better jobs resulting in rapid population
growth especially in the MRSP. Population growth quickly outpaced
infrastructure and service capability leaving the faveldos with poor water
access. The gradual democratization of Brazil was a driving factor in
SABESP’s expansion of water coverage. The onset of democracy gave
civic movements more agency and in forcing SABESP to expand services
into the faveledos. However, rapid service expansion coupled with
economic instability led to a decaying infrastructure with frequent
service interruptions by the mid 1990’s. SABESP was able to turn this
around through a capital injection from the Brazilian government
coupled with changes to its governance model and tariff structure.
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Decentralized : The Santa Cruz de La Sierra Water
Cooperative
This final case study will focus on the Cooperativa de Servicios
Públicos Santa Cruz (SAGUAPAC), a water and sewage utility serving the
city of Santa Cruz de La Sierra, Bolivia. Often literature reviews, water
sector professionals, and international lenders (like the World Bank) cite
SAGUAPAC as one of the best water and sanitation utilities in Latin
America. They note SAGUAPAC’s consistencies in maintaining full cost
recovery, high levels of water coverage, low levels of non-revenue
water, and strong performance in staff efficiency. Such success is often
credited to SAGUAPAC’s cooperative model. A dominant narrative
argues that the democratic nature of SAGUAPAC’s cooperative model
shields the utility from external political influence and profit motive
allowing the utility to be more consumers focused.145 Arguably,
attributing SAGUAPAC’s success to its cooperative model is an
oversimplification. There are other factors that have contributed to
SAGUAPAC’s success: 1) fractured water market; 2) wealthy service

145

Ruiz-Mier and van Ginneken, “Consumer Cooperatives.”; themes also found in Nickson 2000,
Vasquez 2004, and Yavari, Birchall 2003

92

area; 3) World Bank loans for service expansion; and 4) high tariff
charges.

Service Area
The water market in Santa Cruz de la Sierra can be considered
geographically fragmented. Water service is provided by SAGUAPAC
plus seven additional smaller water cooperatives. This fracture reflects
a historical socio-economic divide between the city’s wealthier core and
impoverished periphery.
With over 1.6 million residents Santa Cruz de la Sierra is Bolivia’s
most populous city. Its urban area consists of nine concentric rings of
neighborhoods that radiate out from the city’s colonial center. Paved
roads encircle each ring demarcating boundaries. The four inner rings
are locally referred to as the Casco Viejo. They are the city’s original
core and contain most of the affluent residents and profitable business;
such as financial services, banking, insurance, advertising, and main
offices for the department’s extractive industries. Additionally, many of
Bolivia’s multinationals are headquarter in the Casco Viejo146.
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Established as the city’s first water and sewage utility in 1973,
SAGUAPAC’s service area originally encompassed the Casco Viejo.
Later, as the city expanded, SAUPAC’s service area encompassed parts
of the 5th ring. Today SAGUAPAC is the city’s largest water utilityproviding water service to approximately 64 percent of the city’s
population (1 million residents) with water coverage averaging between
95 to 100 percent147.
The remaining outer rings are locally referred to as the Mancha
Urbana, which translates into ‘urban stain’. The Mancha Urbana is
characterized by high levels of poverty, illegal settlements, and lacks
infrastructure development. Much of its economy is characterized by
informal work in domestic service, construction, transportation, and food
service.148. The remaining seven cooperatives operate in the city’s outer
rings and provide water service to the remaining 36 percent of
residents. Compared to SAGUAPAC the periphery cooperatives are
significantly smaller. Listed in Table 9, the Cooperativa de Servicio
Públicos Tres Mil (COOPLAN) is the city’s second largest cooperative
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providing service to more than 147,000 residents with water coverage
approximately 78 percent149.
Table 11 Santa Cruz de La Sierra Water Coverage
Name

Acronym
SAGUAPAC

Service Area
Pop.
999,582

% Water
Coverage
100%

Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Santa

COOPLAN

147,423

78.2%

COOPAGUAS

114,898

90.3%

COSPAIL

67,472

92.3%

COOPAPPI

54,587

89.0%

COSCHAL

17,064

79.0%

COSPHUL

15,465

96.9%

COOPLIM

7,638

88.1%

Cruz Ltda
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Plan
Tres Mil
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos 1° de
Mayo Ltda
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Andrés
Ibañez
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Pampa
de la Isla
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos Los
Chacos Ltda
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos
Humberto Leigue
Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos
Limoncito
Source: Living without Sanitary Sewers in Latin America
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A criticism of SAGUAPAC is its failure to expand services beyond
the Casco Viejo resulted in a fractured water market with high number
of service providers150. Discussed in the following, much of SAGUAPAC’s
lack of expansion can be contributed to exponential population growth,
poor urban planning, a weak regulator, and challenges in obtaining
financing.

Historical Context
In the 1950’s, Santa Cruz de la Sierra was an impoverished and
isolated frontier town. There were no major arteries of transportation
connecting the city to the rest of the country. The city’s 42,000
residents lacked paved roads, sufficient electricity, and telephone lines.
Water services, if any, were primarily provided through private
initiatives151. By the end of the 1990’s Santa Cruz de la Sierra surpassed
Bolivia’s capital La Paz as the country’s economic center. Both the city
and the Department of Santa Cruz account for 30 percent of Bolivia’s
GDP and the city’s per capita income is 23 percent above the national
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average. A modernized agro-industry, a growing export sector, and a
strong oil industry made Santa Cruz de la Sierra Bolivia’s most
prosperous city152.
Santa Cruz de la Sierra’s dramatic economic growth started in the
1950’s and was fueled by resource rents from the department’s
petroleum reserves and a public expenditure program called ‘March to
the East’. Launched in 1954, The March to the East aimed at offsetting
Bolivia’s over-reliance on tin mining by developing the economies of
Bolivia’s eastern departments. A departmental government committee
called the Comité de Obras Publicas or the Committee of Public Works
(COP) served as the main institutional vehicle for financing ‘March to the
East’ projects and played a primary role in shaping the city’s urban
growth for decades153.
In 1957, the COP contracted an Italian-Brazilian firm called

Companía Técnia Internacional (Technit) to create urban development
plans for Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Techint’s plan was a modernization of
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the city that envisioned a versatile urban space capable of expanding
with rapid economic and population growth. The plan structured the
city into fourradio centric rings of urban living space that radiated out
from the city’s colonial center. The city’s structure resembled a target
with the historical colonial center as the bulls-eye. Unfortunately,
Techint’s plan underestimated population growth. Projections placed
the city’s population at 500,000 by the end of the century. In 2001, the
city’s actual population was more than 1.1 million154. Discussed below
better accessibility and a growing economy fueled population growth.
Table 12: Santa Cruz de la Sierra Population Growth
1800000

1,651,436

1600000
1400000
1200000

1,113,000

1000000
800000

697,000

600000
400000
200000

29,501

42,746

256,000
115,185
50,203 96,091

0

1942

1950

1956

1966

1969

1976

1992

2001

Population of Santa Cruz de la Sierra Pop.
Source: Kirshner, “City Profile: Santa Cruz de la Sierra
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2010

During the 1950’s the Department of Santa Cruz’s economy
transitioned from an antiquated plantation system to a large scale
agribusiness. By the 1960’s Santa Cruz de la Sierra was attracting
international business and funding. Better opportunities from the city’s
economic growth coupled with the 1954 completion of the Cochabamba
to Santa Cruz highway attracted new arrivals. At first, the city’s new
arrivals were mostly lowlanders migrating from rural parts of the eastern
departments. Starting in the late 1970’s new arrivals were migrating
from the western departments and settling beyond the fourth ring. By
the 1980’s population growth outpaced anticipated urban plans. City
planners were unable to meet the basic needs of settlements in the
outer rings155. SAGUAPAC was established in 1973 as a department of
the COP in the midst of Santa Cruz de la Sierra’s exponential population
growth. In 1973, the city’s water coverage was approximately 88
percent. However, do to the city’s population growth outpacing service
expansion water coverage decreased to 78 percent in 1977.156
Recognizing a need for an alternative water service model SAGUAPAC
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separated from the COP in 1979 and was established as Bolivia’s first
water-cooperative157.
There are several reasons SAGUAPAC adopting a cooperative
model. First, there was familiarity with the cooperative utility model.
Santa Cruz de la Sierra already had two utility cooperatives providing
electricity and telephone services. Both were popular with city residents
and served as models.158 Second, a private model was not a viable
option. At the time Bolivia’s private sector was not large enough to
generate/provide the necessary capital159. Finally, there was a strong
opposition by city residents to government ownership of local utilities160.
Such opposition was largely due to resident’s strong sense of regional
identity and self-reliance derived from a long history of the city’s
geographical isolation and neglect by the central government. Since
Bolivia’s independence in the 19th century up until the 1950’s a majority
of government spending and largesse went to the mineral rich western
departments. The eastern departments were largely ignored leading to
pattern of uneven development between the two regions. Since the
157
158
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1950’s, Santa Cruz de la Sierra has been center of an aggressive
regional autonomy movement that not only seeks more political control
from the Bolivian government but economic control as well161. This
regional autonomy contextualizes the social fragmentation between the
Casco Viejo and the Mancha Urbana. The inner rings, mostly wealthy
lowlanders, viewed the outer rings, predominately Andeans, as
invaders.162 This fragmentation could also be another explanation for
SAGUAPAC lack of service expansion. Nickson notes a widely held view
that SAGUAPAC’s lack of expansion is due to the ‘Toborochi’ a secret
society of professional males belonging to traditional crucenos lowland
families.163
Despite being established in 1973, SAGUAPAC did not have a
legally defined service area until 1997. This was largely because of
rapid urban growth and a weak water regulator. First, the rapid
expansion of the outer rings during the 80’s and 90’s outpaced the city’s
government’s ability to define municipal boundaries. The city did not
establish municipal jurisdictions until 1994. Furthermore, the lack of
161
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infrastructure development and urban planning in the outer rings
discouraged service expansion164. Second, until the late 90’s Bolivia had
a weak water regulator. Water and sewage oversight bounced between
the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MHUA) and the Ministry of
Health. There was very little oversight and no established service
standards. The lack of federal involvement is partially attributable to
Bolivia’s 1906 Water Law (Ley de Aguas) which places municipalities in
charge of water regulation and development. Bolivia’s 1994 constitution
changed the government’s role by establishing the state’s ownership of
all water resources. Water utilities would be required to get concession
rights from the state. In 1997, Bolivia’s first water and sewage
regulator the Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico (SISAB) was
established. SISAB granted SAGUAPAC a concession contract
establishing operator’s right for 40 years165.

Organizational Structure and Governance
Often academic literature about SAGUAPAC will credit its success
with its cooperative structure. The utility’s democratic governance
164
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impedes external political influence and profit motive allowing the utility
to be consumer focused166.
SAGUAPAC’s service area is divided into nine districts, each
containing approximately 8,000 to 12,000 members. Households and
businesses connected to SAGUAPAC are members of the cooperative.
New water service connections pay a one-time membership charge of a
US$100 for a Certificate of Cooperation. The certificate is place-based
meaning that if a household is sold than membership is transferred with
the property167. Every two years members vote for three district
representatives to serve in the Delegate Assembly. Through the 27
members Delegate Assembly cooperative member’s interest as
consumers is represented. Once the Delegate Assembly convenes
representatives select six members to serve on the Oversight Board and
nine members to serve on the Administrative Board. The Oversight
Board is responsible for ensuring SAGUAPAC compliance with accounting
and legal norms and hires external auditors. The Administrative Board
is best identified as the link that connects the administration of
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SAGUAPAC to the interest of cooperative members. The Administrative
Board defines SAGUAPAC’s policies, approves its budget, and hires and
supervises the General Manager. To minimize the influence of political
parties on the Administrative delegate members who have been active
in a political party in or have been a candidate in an election within the
last five years are disqualified for service to the Administrative Board168.
A critique of SAGUAPAC’s is that its cooperative structure creates
challenges in raising capital for service expansion in both the private
sector and government. First, the not-for-profit nature of the
cooperative model deters private investors. Second, because
SAGUAPAC’s political autonomy and its success it has few friends and
advocates in government. As a result SAGUAPAC is often passed over
or ignored when lobbying for government investment funds169.

Tariffs and Finance
Despite limitations in raising capital SAGUAPAC has had success in
maintaining full cost-recovery and the expansion of services. This is
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mostly attributed to its tariff, the wealth of its service area, and World
Bank loans.
SAGUAPAC’s tariff has a progressive structure that marginally
increases service cost allowing high water users to subsidize low water
users. SAGUAPAC’s tariff is one of the highest in Latin America. A
significant portion of this is because of high delivery cost due to flat
geography and low population density of its service area.170 SAGUAPAC
claims that for a large part of its membership charges account for 4.5%
of the average family income.171
The March to the East initiative and revenue from petroleum sales
significantly helped in expanding the city’s basic services and creating
SAUGAPAC. However, following SAGUAPAC’s establishment as a
cooperative financing service expansion was challenged. Financing from
the central government was limited by a period of hyperinflation,
brought on by political instability and over borrowing, lasting until
1986172. Financing from international private lenders was not an option
either because, “private investors are not interested in lending to not-
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for-profit cooperatives”173. With the help of two loans from the World
Bank SAGUAPAC was able to expand water service to more than
300,000 residents.
In 1979, the World Bank approved a US$9 million dollar loan to
SAGUAPAC for the expansion of water and sewage services. At that
time about 259,000 residents received water services and the city’s
water coverage was approximately 86 percent. The World Bank loan
financed the expansion of SAGUAPAC’s water pumping and processing
facilities plus the placement of 258 km of piping. Additionally, a new
sewage pumping station was built and 97 km of sewage lines were
added. SAGUAPAC’s water and sewage project was completed by 1987
and expanded water service to an additional 128,000 residents and
sewage service to 60,000 more. Service expansion was completed in
1987 and provided an additional 128,000 residents with water service
and sewage service to another 60,000. Despite the success of the first
World Bank Loan the city’s overall water coverage decreased to 71
percent in 1987. The World Bank’s project completion report attributed
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the persisting shortfall coverage decrease to the city’s high population
growth and significant expansion of the outer rings.174
In 1991, SAGAUPAC again received a World Bank Loan to expand
water and sewage services and for institutional strengtheningimproving management system and staff training. The loan financed
the expansion of water services to more than 225,000 residents and
sewage service to 46,000 more.175 Both loans were considered a
success by the World Bank. The loans goals were achieved and
SAGUAPAC repaid both loans.

SAGUAPAC Summary
As the city’s first water utility SAGUAPAC service area was
established in the city’s inner rings. However, population growth
outpaced urban expansion and the city’s water market fractured. The
smaller water cooperative service the city’s impoverished periphery
while SAGUAPAC’s service area encompasses the wealthy inner core.
This wealth allows SAGUAPAC to maintain one of the highest tariff
charges in Latin America. Additionally, SAGUAPAC does not have to
174
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deal with the challenges of poor infrastructure development found in the
city’s periphery.
As a water cooperative SAGUAPAC is frequently praised for its
democratic structure, its transparency, and its insulation from profit
motive and political corruption. A consequence to the cooperative
structure is the difficulty in obtaining financing for service expansion.
SAGUAGPAC’s non-profit nature is discouraging to lending institutions.
Additionally, SAGUAPAC’s political shielding does leave the utility with
few friends and advocates in Bolivia’s government. Despite this
SAGUAPAC has been able to expand and strengthen its infrastructure
thanks to its high tariff charges and several World Bank Loans.
SAGUAPAC is an exemplary example of a well-functioning water
utility capable of providing universal coverage to over 1 million users.
Often this success is attributed to SAGUAPAC water cooperative
structure. However, success cannot be simply attributed to the
cooperative model. SAGUAPAC has benefited from the wealth of its
service area, loans from the World Bank, and high tariff charges.
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Conclusion
Water matters. And who manages water utilities matter just as
much. There have been numerous example of contentious and
sometimes violent protest resulting from ownership change. In Buenos
Aires, Argentina the privatization of their water utility resulted in
pushback from the community after a tariff increase. In São Paulo,
Brazil SABESP’s decision to concentrate on providing businesses and
industry water access while largely ignoring the favelas resulted in
numerous protests. This thesis sought to investigate the impact that
management models of water utilities had on water coverage.
Two levels of analysis were used. First, a statistical analysis of
144 water utilities in 33 different countries was conducted. Each of the
144 utilities was categorized as private, public, or decentralized.
Regression analysis was used to identify significance between each
ownership model’s water coverage and efficiency. Integrating with the
data analysis a comparative case study of a privately owned water utility
in Argentina, a publically owned water utility in Brazil, and a water
cooperative in Bolivia was used to explore the impact of historical,
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political, and economic factors that significantly impacted water
coverage.
Regression analysis showed that there is the possibility that at
some level- management models can impact water coverage. For
publicly and privately owned water utilities, plugging leaks can translate
into high rates of water coverage. For decentralized water utilities high
levels of unit operational cost can increase water coverage. Regression
analysis also shows that broad claims about ownership, efficiency, and
improved water coverage should be suspect. Not one ownership model
established a satisfactory relationship between water coverage and all
three independent variables. However, the case studies showed that
historical, political, economic, and institutions impact water coverage.
In 1993, Buenos Aires public water utility was to the private water
consortium Aguas Argentina (AASA). Privatization was implemented
with the goal of achieving universal water coverage through efficiency
gains and full cost recovery. However, a rushed privatization process
neglected local historical, political, geographical, and economic factors
all of which created unique challenges to service provision and
expansion. Furthermore, this rushed process created weak water
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governance that failed to curtail AASA opportunistic behavior. AASA
continuously failed to meet performance targets, which lead to the
renationalization of the utility in 2006.
Established in 1973, SABESP was created through government
development programs aimed at establishing and strengthening state
owned water and sanitation companies. SABESP was established during
a period of exponential industrial growth and chaotic urbanization in São
Paulo. Themes of military rule, industrialization, and urbanization
challenged SABESP’s ability to expand water services. The gradual
democratization of Brazil was a driving factor in SABESP’s expansion of
water coverage. The onset of democracy gave civic movements more
agency in forcing SABESP to expand services into the faveledos.
However, rapid service expansion coupled with economic instability led
to a decaying infrastructure with frequent service interruptions by the
mid 1990’s. SABESP was able to turn this around through a capital
injection from the Brazilian government coupled with changes to its
governance model and tariff structure.
Established in 1973, SAGUAPAC’s has grown to become one of the
world’s largest water cooperatives. SAGUAPAC is frequently praised for
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its democratic structure, its transparency, and its insulation from profit
motive and political corruption. SAGAUPAC was challenged by the rapid
growth of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Despite this SAGUAPAC has
maintained near universal water coverage for its service area.
Attributing SAGUAPAC success to it cooperative model is an
oversimplification. SAGUAPAC has also benefited from the wealth of its
service area, loans from the World Bank, and high tariff charges.
Do ownerships models alone impact water coverage through
efficiency improvements? Not really. Statistical analysis could not
establish a strong relationship between management models’ water
coverage and water production, non-revenue, and unit operational
costs. Perhaps better segmentation of the case studies of management
models could yield different results. For example, instead of looking at
all privatization models only look at concession contracts. However, the
case studies compliment this thesis’ statistical analysis. In all three case
studies management models alone could not explain successes or
failures in water delivery. For AASA the cultural concept of canilla libre
coupled with Argentinian economic crisis significantly contributed to the
utilities failure. In Brazil, protests and democracy pushed SABESP to
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expand into the favelas. Finally, SAGUAPAC’s success can be attributed
to more than just its cooperative model- the wealth of the service area,
World Bank loans, and high tariff charges.
This thesis did expect to see decentralized management models
performing the best. However, statistical analysis coupled with case
studies has concluded that this assumption is wrong. A broad
conclusion about management models cannot be drawn. Success and
failure are impacted by more nuanced historical, economic, political,
geographical, and social factors.
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